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Abstract
In this paper we propose a characterization of stochastic choice
under risk and under uncertainty. We presume that decision makers'
actual choices are governed by randomly selected states of mind, and
study the representation of decision makers' perceptions of the sto-
chastic process underlying the selection of their state of mind. The
connections of this work to the literatures on random choice, choice
behavior when preference are incomplete; choice of menus; and grades
of indecisiveness are also discussed.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a theory of random choice under uncertainty and
under risk motivated by the recognition that there are situations in which the
decision maker's tastes are subject to random variations. In these situations,
a decision maker's choice behavior displays a stochastic pattern represented
by a probability distribution on the set of alternatives.
The idea advanced in this paper is that variability in choice behavior is an
expression of internal conict among distinct inclinations, or distinct \selves"
of the decision maker, whose assessments of the alternatives are dierent. We
refer to these inclinations as \states of minds" and assume that, analogous
to a state of nature, a state of mind resolves the uncertainty surrounding a
decision maker's true subjective beliefs and/or tastes. Our theory presumes
that, at a meta level, decision makers entertain beliefs about their likely
state of mind when having to choose among uncertain, or risky, prospects;
that their actual choice is determined by the state of mind that obtains; and
that the observed choice probabilities are consistent with these beliefs. In
other words, a decision maker's state of mind governs his choice behavior
in the sense that, when having to choose among acts (or lotteries), a state
of mind, encompassing beliefs and risk attitudes, is selected at random and
that state of mind determines which alternative is chosen. The focus of our
investigation is the representation of the decision maker's perception of the
stochastic process underlying the selection of his state of mind. We presume
that this process is accessible by introspection and that it agrees with the
empirical distribution characterizing the random choice rule.
The fact that states of mind are preference relations has two crucial im-
plications: It renders the evaluation of the outcomes { acts or lotteries, as
the case may be { dependent on the state (of mind) and it lends the states
of mind the inherently quality of private information (as opposed to states of
nature which are observable). These implications raise two diculties. First,
because the preference relation is state dependent, subjective expected utility
theory fails to deliver a unique prior. Second, because states of mind are pri-
vate information, they express themselves, indirectly, through choices among
menus rather than directly through the choice of acts. To overcome the rst
diculty, we apply a modied version of the model of Karni and Schmeidler
(1980, 2015). To overcome the second diculty, building on ideas introduced
by Kreps (1979) and developed by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001), we
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derive preferences over acts from those on menus. Hence, we assume that
a decision maker is characterized by two primitive preference relations: a
preference relation on the set of menus of alternatives depicting his actual
choice behavior and an introspective preference relation on hypothetical men-
tal state-act lotteries.
The preference relation on the set of menus induces preferences on the
set of mental acts (that is, mappings from the set of states of mind to the set
of uncertain, or risky, prospects). Both the preference relation on the set of
mental acts and that on the mental state-act lotteries are assumed to satisfy
the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and, when a natural correspondence
connects between their domains, they are required to agree with each other.
This model yields a representation of the preference relations over mental
acts induced by menus that takes the form of subjective expected utility with
state-dependent utility functions dened on uncertain, or risky, prospects and
a unique subjective prior on the set of states of mind. The distribution on
the mental state space characterizes the decision maker's stochastic choice
behavior.
More formally, let f<!j ! 2 
g be a set of preference relations on the
set, H; of Anscombe-Aumann (1963) acts, and assume that they satisfy the
axioms of expected utility theory. A menu, M; is a non-empty compact
subset of Anscombe-Aumann acts. An act induced by M; denoted fM , is an
assignment to each ! 2 
 of an act h 2M such that h <! h0; for all h0 2M:
We denote by F the set of acts induced by menus. Let <^ be a preference
relation on the set of all menus. Dene the induced preference relation on
F as follows: fM < fM 0 if M<^M 0: Broadly speaking, the main result of
this paper is identifying necessary and sucient conditions that yield the
following representation: There exist a continuous, non-constant, real-valued
function u on 
  H that is ane in its second argument and is unique
up to positive linear transformation, and an essentially unique probability
distribution  on 
 such that, for all fM ; fM 0 2 F;
fM < fM 0 ,
P
!2

 (!) [u (!; fM (!))  u (!; fM 0 (!))]  0:
Moreover, for every two acts h and h0, the probability of choosing h over h0
is given by
Pr (h j fh; h0g) =  (f! 2 
 j u (!; h)  u (!; h0)g) :
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In the context of risk, this representation is similar to that of Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini (2001). However, the uniqueness of  is specic to
our model.1
The theory developed in this paper is related not only to the literature on
random choice but also to the literature on choice behavior when preference
relations are incomplete, the literature on choice of menus, and the work on
grades of indecisiveness.
Applying our model to menus of lotteries, we show that our theory im-
plies the axioms of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006). Hence, the probability mea-
sure  generates their random utility and random choice model. All our
preference relations are dened ex ante, at an earlier stage, before the ac-
tual choice among various acts/lotteries. In that stage, the decision maker
chooses among menus of alternatives. We do not make explicit the later, ex
post, choice, but, as indicated above, we assume that it is consistent with
the expectations the decision maker has at the earlier stage. To make the
connection between the two stages more explicit, one can follow Ahn and
Sarver (2013), who join together the ex ante model of Dekel et. al. (2001)
with the ex post random choice of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006).
The representation of incomplete preferences under uncertainty species
a set of utility-probability pairs and requires that one alternative be strictly
preferred over another if and only if the former yields higher subjective ex-
pected utility than the latter according to each utility-probability in the
set.2 In this context, we identify states of mind with utility-probability pairs.
When the alternatives are noncomparable, the choice may be random. Our
model implies that the likelihood that one alternative is chosen over another
is the measure (according to ) of the subset of the states of mind that prefer
that alternative.
We also show that Minardi and Savochkin's (2015) notion of grades of
indecisiveness between two Anscombe-Aumann acts, say f and g; can be
represented by the probability  of the set f! 2 
 j f ! gg:
The model developed in this paper is related to the literature on prob-
abilistic choice originated by Luce and Suppes (1965) and later developed
1Sadowski (2013) obtained uniqueness of the probabilities in the model of Dekel et. al.
(2001) by enriching the model with objective states.
2See Galaabaatar and Karni (2013). In the case of incomplete preferences under risk,
we identify states of mind with utility function and the analogous results are Dubra,
Maccheroni, and and Ok,. (2004) and Shapley and Baucells, (2008).
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by Loomes and Sugden (1995). Recently, Melkonyan and Safra (2015) ax-
iomatized the utility components of two families of such preferences, where
one family satises the independence axiom. Our paper complements and
extends that model by characterizing the inherent probability distribution
over the possible states of mind (possible tastes).
A more detailed discussion of the connections between this paper and
these branches of the literature appears in section 3, following the presenta-
tion of our theory in the next section. The proofs are relegated to section
4.
2 Stochastic Choice Theory
2.1 The analytical framework: Revealed preferences
over mental acts induced by menus
2.1.1 Acts and preferences
Let X be a nite set of outcomes, and denote by  (X) the set of all
probability measures on X: For each p; q 2 (X), and  2 [0; 1] ; dene
p + (1  ) q 2 (X) by (p+ (1  ) q) (x) = p (x) + (1  ) q (x) ; for
all x 2 X:
Let S be a nite set of material states (or states of nature), and denote
by H the set of all mappings from S to  (X) : Elements of H are referred
to as acts.3 For all h; h0 2 H, and  2 [0; 1], dene h + (1  )h0 2 H by
(h+ (1  )h0) (s) = h (s)+(1  )h0 (s) ; for all s 2 S; where the convex
operation h (s) + (1  )h0 (s) is dened as above. Under this denition,
H is a convex subset of the linear space RjXjjSj:
Let P be the set of all preference relations on H whose structure is de-
picted by the following axioms:
(A.1) (Strict total order) The preference relation  is asymmetric and
negatively transitive.
(A.2) (Archimedean) For all h; h0; h00 2 H; if h  h0 and h0  h00, then
h+ (1  )h00  h0 and h0  h0 (1  )h00 for some ;  2 (0; 1).
3See Anscombe-Aumann (1963).
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(A.3) (Independence) For all h; h0; h00 2 H and  2 (0; 1]; h  h0 if and
only if h+ (1  )h00  h0 + (1  )h00:
(A.4) (Nontriviality)  is not empty.
By the expected utility theorem, a preference relation satises (A.1)-
(A.4) if and only if there exists a nonconstant real-valued function, w (x; s) ;
on XS, unique up to cardinal unit-comparable transformation,4 such that,
for all h; h0 2 H;5
h  h0 , P
s2S
P
x2X
w (x; s) [h (s) (x)  h0 (s) (x)] > 0:
2.1.2 States of mind and mental acts induced by menus
Let 
 be a nite, nonempty set and consider the subset of preferences P
 =
f!2 P j ! 2 
g: We refer to ! as a state of mind depicting a possible
mood, or persona, of the decision maker. To avoid notational redundancy
we assume that ! 6=!0 for all ! 6= !0. To simplify the notation, we also
identify ! with ! and refer to 
 as the mental state space. Let <! be a
binary relation on H dened by h <! h0 if : (h0 ! h) : Then, <! is complete
and transitive.
A menu is a nonempty compact subset of H: LetM be the set of menus,
and denote by M its generic element. For each M 2M, dene a correspon-
dence 'M : 
 H as follows: For every ! 2 
;
'M (!) = fh 2M j h <! h0;8h0 2Mg:
The correspondence 'M maps mental states to subsets of !-equivalent acts
in H.
Let F^ := ff : 
! Hg be the set of all mappings from 
 toH: Elements of
F^ are referred to asmental acts. The set F^ is a convex set (with respect to the
operation (f + (1  ) f 0) (!) = f (!)+(1  ) f 0 (!) ; for all ! 2 
). Let
F := ff 2 F^ j 9M 2M : 8!; f (!) 2 'M (!)g. An element of F is dubbed
amental act induced byM: It is an element of F^ that maximizes all preference
4A function w^ (x; s) is said to be cardinal unit-comparable transformation of w (x; s) if
there there exist a real number b > 0 and a 2 RS such that w^ (x; s) = bw (x; s)+ a (s) ; for
all (x; s) 2 X  S:
5See Kreps (1988).
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relations ! 2 
 overM:We denote by fM  F the set of mental acts induced
by M: Let ^ be a preference relation on M depicting the decision maker's
observable behavior when faced with choice among menus. We assume that
^ satises the analogue of axioms (A.1)-(A.4), where mixtures of menus
are dened by mixing all possible pairs of acts in which the acts belong to
distinct menus. Dene an induced preference relation  on F by f  f 0 if
f 2 fM ; f 0 2 fM 0 and M^M 0: This denition presumes that, when decision
makers compare two menus, M and M 0, they imagine selecting mental acts
from fM and fM 0 ; respectively, and comparing them. Clearly, if f; f
0 2 fM
then f  f 0. Henceforth, we treat fM as an element of F: Unlike ^; the
induced preference relation  on F is dened on mental constructs which
are not directly observable and must be inferred from the decision maker's
choice of menus. Clearly, the induced preference relation  on F satises the
axioms (A.1)-(A.4). The following lemma ensures that these requirements
are nonvacuous.
Lemma 1: F is a convex set.
Remark 1. The mental state space is analogous to the subjective state space
introduced by Kreps (1979). However, unlike Kreps, who derived the exis-
tence of an innite subjective state space from preference for exibility (that
is, from preferences over menus), we take the existence of a nite subjective
state space as a primitive aspect of the model (which nds its expression in
preferences over menus). To construct the subjective state space, we can use
the approach of Karni (2015) according to which there is a nite set, ~F ; of
alternatives. Menus are nonempty subsets of ~F : Let ~M denote the set of all
menus consisting of elements of ~F : The subjective state space induced by ~M
is the set of mappings ~
 := f! : ~M ! ~F j ! (M) 2 M; 8M 2 ~Mg. Note
that, if alternatives are agreed upon by distinct observers, then the derived
state space is objective and is determined independently of the preferences of
the decision maker. As pointed out by Karni (2015), in general, the states in
~
 do not correspond to complete and transitive preference relations. How-
ever, suppose that there is a choice function c : ~M ! ~M (i.e., c (M)  M;
for all M 2 ~M) that satises the weak axiom of revealed preference. If for
all !; ! (M) 2 c (M) for all M , then each state correspond to a complete
and transitive preference relation, <! on ~F : Moreover, the aforementioned
state space is unique.
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In some applications (e.g., when the preference relation on acts, in the
case of uncertainty, or lotteries, in the case of risk, is incomplete) the existence
and uniqueness are implied by the representation (see discussion in section
3.1 below).
2.2 The analytical framework: State-act lotteries and
introspective preferences
2.2.1 State-act lotteries and their decomposition
Let L^ (
H) be the set of probability distributions on 
  H with nite
supports. Elements of L^ (
H) are state-act lotteries. A state-act lottery
` 2 L^ (
H) is said to be non-degenerate if ` (!) : = h2H` (!; h) > 0; for
every ! 2 
: Clearly, ` 2 (
).
Assume that ` is non-degenerate and consider the function J : L^ (
H)!
F^ dened by
J (`) (!) =
X
h2H
` (!; h)
` (!)
h; for all ! 2 
:
For the uniform distribution  (!) = 1j
j in  (
), dene the function K :
F ! L^ (
H) by
K (f) (!; h) =
 1
j
j f (!) = h
0 otherwise
Clearly, K (f) is non-degenerate and J (K (f)) = f . Henceforth, we focus
the attention on ` 2 L^ (
H) such that J (`) 2 F: Dene
L (
H) = f` 2 L^ (
H) j ` non-degenerate and J (`) 2 Fg:
Lemma 2: L (
H) is a convex set.
2.2.2 Introspective preferences and consistency
Let  be a binary relation on L (
H) and assume that  satises the
analogue of axioms (A.1) - (A.4).6 We refer to  as introspective preference
6Recall that in expected utility theory, the set of outcomes that constitutes the support
of the lotteries is arbitrary. Consequently, the set of state-act lotteries in this paper is a
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relation. Dene < on L (
H) ; by ` < `0 if : (`0  `). These preference
relations express the decision maker's beliefs about his behavior if he could
choose between lotteries L (
H). We presume that the decision maker is
conscious that he may experience dierent moods, and that he is capable of
expressing preferences not only among acts given a certain mood (which is
captured by the state of mind !) but also across acts in dierent moods.
For example, the decision maker is supposed to be able to claim, upon intro-
spection, that he prefers listening to Beethoven 9th symphony when in good
mood over listening to Mozart's requiem when depressed. Because, in gen-
eral, the decision maker does not get to choose his mood, the introspective
preferences are hypothetical and can only be expressed verbally.
Two state-act lotteries ` and `0 are said to agree outside ! if ` (!0; ) =
`0 (!0; ) ; for all !0 2 
nf!g: Similarly, two mental acts,f and f 0 are said to
agree outside ! if f (!0) = f 0 (!0) ; for all !0 2 
nf!g: Following Karni and
Schmeidler (2015) we make the following denition and axiom.
Denition 1: A state of mind ! 2 
 is obviously null if f  f 0 for all
f; f 0 2 F that agree outside !; and there exist `; `0 2 L(
  H) that agree
outside !; such that `  `0; it is obviously nonnull if there are f; f 0 2 F that
agree outside ! and f  f 0.
The following example demonstrates that the denitions above are not
vacuous.
Example: Assume there are two material states (S = fs1; s2g), let 
 =
f!; !0g and considerM = fh; h0g andM 0 = fh; h00g such that h ! h0 ! h00;
h0 !0 h00 !0 h: Then fM (!) = h; fM (!0) = h0 and fM 0 (!) = h; fM 0 (!0) =
h00 (see Figure 1 where, for simplicity, h, h0 and h00 assign degenerate lotteries
with both material states si). Denote `M = K (fM) and `M 0 = K (fM 0). Then
`M (!; h) =
1
2
= `M 0 (!; h) ; `M

!; h^

= 0 = `M 0

!; h^

for all h^ 2 Hnfhg;
`M (!
0; h0) = 1
2
= `M 0 (!
0; h00) ; `M

!0; h^

= 0, for all h^ 2 Hnfh0g and
`M 0

!0; h^

= 0 for all h^ 2 Hnfh00g: Hence, `M agrees with `M 0 outside !0:
Suppose that `M  `M 0 : If J (`M)  J (`M 0) then !0 is obviously null and if
J (`M)  J (`M 0) then !0 is obviously nonnull.
special case of the theory of von Neumman and Morgenstern, and the applicability of the
axioms is implied.
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Insert Figure 1
(A.5) Consistency I. For all ! 2 
 and all non-degenerate `; `0 2 L(
H)
such that ` agrees with `0 outside !: if J (`)  J (`0) then `  `0.
2.3 Representation of preferences over menus and in-
trospective preferences: Uncertainty
The following theorem asserts the existence and describes the uniqueness
properties of subjective expected utility representations of the preference
relations < on the set of mental acts induced by menus and < on the set of
state-act lotteries. This theorem extends Theorem 3 of Karni and Schmeidler
(1980): whereas their domain is the entire set of state-prize lotteries, ours
is the more complex set of mental-state-act lotteries that are mapped into
mental acts induced by menus.
Theorem 1: Let < on L (
H) and < on F be binary relations. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(a:i) The asymmetric parts of < and < satisfy (A.1) - (A.4) and jointly they
satisfy (A.5).
(a:ii) There exist continuous, non-constant, real-valued function u on 
H
that is ane in its second argument, and a probability distribution  on 

such that, for all fM ; fM 0 2 F;
fM < fM 0 ,
P
!2

 (!) [u (!; fM (!))  u (!; fM 0 (!))]  0; (1)
and, for all `; `0 2 L (
H) ;
` < `0 , P
!2

P
h2H
u (!; h) ` (!; h)  P
!2

P
h2H
u (!; h) `0 (!; h) : (2)
(b) u is unique up to positive linear transformation.
(c) For obviously null ! 2 
,  (!) = 0, and for obviously non-null ! 2 
,
 (!) > 0. Moreover, if all states of mind are obviously non-null then  is
unique.
The proof is given in Section 5.
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Applying the model of Karni and Schmeidler to the preference relations !2
P , it can be shown that the utility function in the representations in Theorem
1 takes the linear form u (!; h) = s2S (!; s) x2Xu (!; x)h (s) (x) ; where
 (!; ) is a probability measure on the material state space, S; representing
the beliefs of a decision maker whose mood is ! :
Finally, note that, by denition and (1), the representation of ^ onM is
as follows:
M^M 0 , P
!2

 (!) [u (!; fM (!))  u (!; fM 0 (!))] > 0:
The importance of the preference relation on menus is that, unlike < on F;
which is inferred relation, it is directly observable in the sense of depicting
actual choice behavior.
2.4 Representation of preferences over menus and in-
trospective preferences: Risk
2.4.1 The analytical framework: Mental acts induced by menus
The analysis of preferences over menus under risk is the special case of prefer-
ences over menus under uncertainty in which the set of material states space
is a singleton and can be ignored. Here, 
 is a nite, nonempty set represent-
ing preferences over  (X), menus are non-empty compact subsets of  (X)
andMr is the set of all menus: For eachM 2Mr, dene the correspondence
'rM : 
 (X) as follows: For every ! 2 
;
'rM (!) = fp 2M j p <! q;8q 2Mg:
The correspondence 'rM maps the set of mental states to subsets of !-
equivalent lotteries. In the present context, one interpretation of mental
state is risk attitude.
Let G^ := fg : 
 ! (X)g be the set of all mappings from 
 to  (X) :
Elements of G^ are dubbed AA mental acts.7 Clearly, G^ is a convex set under
the usual denition. Let G := fg 2 G^ j 9M 2 Mr : 8!; g (!) 2 'rM (!)g:
We denote by gM  G the set of AA mental acts induced by M: Let ^r be a
preference relation onMr depicting the decision maker's observable behavior
7AA for Anscombe and Aumann.
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when faced with choice among menus. As before, we assume that ^r satises
the analogue of axioms (A.1) - (A.4) where mixtures of menus are dened by
mixing all possible pairs of acts in which the acts belong to distinct menus.
Dene an induced preference relation G on G by: g  g0 if g 2 gM ; g0 2 gM 0
and M^rM 0: By argument analogous to Lemma 1, G is a convex set. We
assume that the induced preference relation G on G satises the analogue
of axioms (A.1) - (A.4).
2.4.2 The analytical framework: Mental states-roulette lotteries
Let L^ (
(X)) be the set of simple probability distributions over 
 
(X) : As before, let ` (!) : = p2(X)` (!; p) ; for every ! 2 
:
Assume that ` is non-degenerate and consider the function I : L^ (
(X))!
G^ dened by
I (`) (!) =
X
p2(X)
` (!; p)
` (!)
p; for all ! 2 
:
For the uniform distribution  (!) = 1j
j in  (
), dene the function T :
G! L^ (
(X)) by
T (g) (!; p) =
 1
j
j g (!) = p
0 otherwise
Clearly, T (g) is non-degenerate and I (T (g)) = g. Dene
L (
(X)) = f` 2 L^ (
(X)) j ` non-degenerate and I (`) 2 Gg:
By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2, L (
(X)) is a convex
set.
2.4.3 Consistency and representation
LetL be a preference relations on L (
(X)) and assume that it satises
the analogue of (A.1)-(A.4). Analogously to Denition 1, a state of mind
! 2 
; is said to be obviously null if, for all g; g0 2 G such that g agrees with
g0 outside !; g G g and there exist that `; `0 2 L (
(X)) such that `
agrees with `0 outside !; and ` L `0. It is obviously nonnull if g G g; for
some g; g0 2 G such that g agrees with g0 outside !:
The next axiom is analogous to (A.5).
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(A.6) Consistency II. For all ! 2 
, and all non-degenerate `; `0 2 L(

(X)) such that ` agrees with ` outside !; I (`) G I (`0) implies
` L `0.
Corollary: Let <L on L (
(X)) and <G on G be binary relations then
the following conditions are equivalent:
(a:i) The asymmetric parts of <L and <G satisfy (A.1) - (A.4) and jointly
they satisfy (A.6).
(a:ii) There exist a non-constant, real-valued function u on 
  (X)
ane in its second argument, and a probability distributions  on 
 such
that for gM ; g

M 0 2 G;
gM <G gM 0 ,
P
!2

 (!) [u (!; gM (!))  u (!; gM 0 (!))]  0; (3)
and, for all `; `0 2 L (
(X)) ;
` <L `0 ,
P
!2

" P
p2(X)
u (!; p) ` (!; p)  P
p2(X)
u (!; p) `0 (!; p)
#
 0: (4)
(b) u is unique up to positive linear transformation.
(c) If ! 2 
 is obviously null then  (!) = 0, and if it is obviously nonnull
then  (!) > 0. Moreover,if all states of mind are obviously non-null then 
is unique.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and is not given here.
Remark 3. For every ! 2 
; and ; ` 2 L (
(X)), ` (!; ) is a compound
lottery. Hence, by the reduction of compound lottery axiom,
` (!; p) (x) =
P
p2(X)
` (!; p) p (x) ; 8x 2 X:
Since u (!; ) in (4) is ane, u (!; p) = x2Xu (!; x) p (x) : Hence, for every
! 2 
; and ` 2 L (
(X)) ;P
p2(X)
u (!; p) ` (!; p) =
P
x2X
u (!; x)
P
p2(X)
` (!; p) p (x) :
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3 Relation to the Literature
3.1 Choice Behavior when Preferences are Incomplete
When the preference relation is complete, there is no distinction between
preference and choice behavior. The representation of the preferences is the
choice criterion. By contrast, when the preference relation is incomplete, and
the choice is between non-comparable alternatives, the representation does
not indicate which of the alternatives will be selected. In particular, the
choice between alternatives that are non-comparable may be random. This,
however, does not mean that non-comparable alternatives are equally likely
to be selected. If one alternative is \almost better" then the other, then it
stands to reason that it is more likely to be chosen. To lend this idea concrete
meaning we note that, in general, in subjective expected utility theory with
incomplete preferences one alternative is strictly preferred over another if its
subjective expected utility is greater according to a set of pairs of utilities and
subjective probabilities.8 Special cases include complete tastes, in which one
alternative is strictly preferred over another if its subjective expected utility
is greater according to a set of subjective probabilities, and complete beliefs,
in which one alternative is strictly preferred over another if its subjective
expected utility is greater according to a set utilities functions. Similarly,
in expected utility theory under risk, one alternative is strictly preferred
over another if its expected utility is greater according to a set of utilities
functions.9
Note that if the representation involves a set, 	; of probability-utility
pairs, as in the case of subjective expected utility theory with incomplete
preferences, or a set of utility functions, U , as in the case of expected util-
ity theory under risk with incomplete preferences, then the set of states of
mind is uniquely dened. More specically, each (; U) 2 	 denes a state
of mind ! which is the preference relation on F induced by the functionalP
s2S (s)
P
x2X U(x)f(x; s): Similarly, in the case of risk, each u 2 U denes
a state of mind ! which is the preference relation on G induced by the func-
tional
P
x2X u(x)p (x) : The uniqueness is an implication of the uniqueness of
the corresponding representations. To state the uniqueness result, consider
8See Galaabaatar and Karni (2013).
9See Bewley (1986), Galaabaatar and Karni (2013), Dubra, Maccheronni and Ok
(2004), Shapley and Baucells (2008) and Galaabaatar and Karni (2012).
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rst the case of incomplete preferences under risk. Following Dubra et. al.
(2004) denote by hUi the closure of the convex cone generated by all the
functions in U and all the constant function on  (X) : If V is another set of
utility functions representing the same incomplete preference relation under
risk, then hVi = hUi:10 Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) obtained analogous
uniqueness result in the case of incomplete preferences under uncertainty.
In all of these instances, two alternatives are non-comparable if one is
preferred over the other according to some elements in the corresponding set
(e.g., some utility-probability pairs) and the second alternative is preferred
over the rst according to the rest of the elements in the corresponding set.
It seems natural to suppose that the likelihood that the rst alternative is
chosen depends on the measure of the set of utilities and/or probabilities,
as the case may be, according to which the expected utility of the rst is
larger than that of the second. This presumption expresses the idea that one
probability-utility pair is selected at random and the corresponding state of
mind governs the particular choice. The question is what is the appropri-
ate measure on the mental state space that describes this random selection
process?
The theory developed in this paper suggests that the set of utility prob-
ability pairs correspond to the set, 
; of states of mind; that the decision
maker can assess the likelihoods of distinct states of mind by introspection;
and that the likelihood of a particular state of mind (or utility probability
pair) is selected to decide between the alternatives is given by :
Suppose that, when facing a choice among acts, the decision maker be-
haves as if a state of mind from 
 is drawn according to the distribution ;
and that this state of mind determines his choice. Specically, given a menu
M = ff1; :::; fng; and assuming that all elements of 'M (!) are selected with
equal probabilities, the probability that fi is chosen is i; i = 1; :::; n; is as
follows: Let 	M(fi) := f! 2 
 j fi 2 'M (!)g
i =
X
!2	M (fi)
(!)
1
j 'M (!) j . (5)
A special case concerns doubleton menus. Let M = ff; gg and denote by
 (f; g) the probability that f is chosen from the menu M: According to our
10Dubra et. al. (2004) includes that case in which X is a compact set in a metric space.
The result for the case in which X is nite appears in by Galaabaatar and Karni (2012).
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approach,
 (f; g) =
X
!2	M (f)
(!)
1
j 'M (!) j : (6)
Consider next the case of subjective expected utility theory with incom-
plete preferences. Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) dene a weak preference
relation <GK on H as follows: For all f; g 2 H, f <GK g if h  f im-
plies h  g for all h 2 H: Thus, f <GK g if and only if there exists a
set, 	; of ane utility functions on  (X) and probability measures on S
such that
P
s2S ^(s)
P
x2X U^(x) [f(x; s)  g(x; s)] = 0 for some

^; U^

2
	 and
P
s2S (s)
P
x2X U(x) [f(x; s)  g(x; s)] > 0 holds for all (; U) 2
	nf

^; U^

g:
Consider the case in which 	 is nite. Applying the theory of this paper
we obtain the following implications: (a) f  g if and only if  (f; g) = 1
(that is, f ! g for every ! 2 
): (b) f <GK g if and only if f <! g for
every ! 2 
; with indierence for a subset 
^ of 
: The probability that f is
selected is  (f; g) = 1  


^

=2: (c) If f and g are non-comparable (that
is, : (f <GK g) and : (g <GK f)) then the probability that f is selected over
g is  (f; g) 2 (0; 1) :
3.2 Grades of indecisiveness
In a recent paper, Minardi and Savochkin (2015) address the issue of choice
in the context of incomplete beliefs, represented by a set of priors. They
model a decision maker's inclination to choose one Anscombe-Aumann act
over another when he is indecisive. This inclination nds it expression in
the decision maker's reported predisposition to choose one alternative over
another. Minardi and Savochkin formalized this idea using, as primitive,
a binary relation, % on the set of ordered pairs of acts. They interpret
the relation (f; g) % (f 0; g0) as indicating that the decision maker is more
condent that f is at least a good as g than that f 0 is at least as good as g0:
Minardi and Savochkin give necessary and sucient conditions on % for the
existence of a function, ; assigning to every to pair of Anscombe-Aumann
acts, f and g; a real number,  (f; g) 2 [0; 1] such that (f; g) % (f 0; g0) if and
only if  (f; g)   (f 0; g0) : Moreover, under these conditions the function 
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is a capacity of the subset of the set of priors according to which the expected
utility of f is greater or equal to that of g:
To connect the model of this paper to the work of Minardi and Savochkin
(2015), consider the special case of doubleton menus. LetM = ff; gg and de-
note by  (f; g) the probability that f is chosen from the menuM: According
to our approach,  (f; g) is given in (6).
If we assume that the ordinal ranking of the elements of X is independent
of the decision maker's state of mind (e.g., if X are monetary payo), it is
easy to verify that  (f; g) satises the properties of the function  of Minardi
and Savochkin (2015).11 Thus, the application of our approach to doubleton
menus of Anscombe-Aumann acts whose payos are roulette lotteries over
monetary outcomes yields a result which is analogous to that of Minardi and
Savochkin.
Unlike Minardi and Savochkin (2015), whose concern is incomplete be-
liefs, in our model, there is a single prior on the mental state space, a set of
material state-dependent utility functions on outcomes and probability mea-
sures on the material state space representing the decision maker's states of
the mind. In our model, distinct states of mind may represent distinct tastes
(e.g., risk attitudes) and/or beliefs on the material state space, corresponding
to dierent moods of the decision maker.
3.3 Random choice behavior
A random choice rule is an assignment of a probability distribution to every
feasible set of alternatives, depicting the relative frequencies according to
which a decision maker chooses these alternatives. A random utility function
is a (nitely additive) probability measure on a set of utility functions. Gul
and Pesendorfer (2006) gave necessary and sucient conditions for a random
11The properties are: Reexivity (i.e.,  (f; f) = 1). Weak transitivity (i.e., for all
f; g; h 2 H;  (f; g) = 1 implies  (f; h)   (g; h)). Monotonicity (i.e., fM (!) = f for
all ! 2 
 implies  (f; g) = 1). Independence (i.e., for all f; g; h 2 H and  2 (0; 1];
 (f; g) =  (f + (1  )h; g + (1  )h)). Reciprocity (i.e., for all f; g 2 H;  (f; g) 2
(0; 1] implies  (g; f) = 1   (f; g)). Continuity (i.e., for all f; g; h 2 H and  2 [0; 1] ; the
sets f 2 [0; 1] j  (f + (1  ) g; h)  g and f 2 [0; 1] j  (h; f + (1  ) g)  g are
closed). Non-degeneracy (i.e.,  (f; g) = 0; for some f; g 2 H). If, in addition, we assume
that the ordinal ranking of the elements of X is independent of the decision maker's
state of mind, and consider doubleton menus M = fx; yg; then our model implies C-
Completeness (i.e., either  (x; y) = 1 or  (y; x) = 1).
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choice rule to maximize a random utility function when the set of outcomes
is nite and the set of utility functions is the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities over distributions on the set of outcomes.
The model in this paper is close in spirit to the Gul-Pesendorfer represen-
tation of random choice rules.12 What Gul and Pesendorfer call a decision
problem is a menu M = fp1; :::; png  (X), and what they refer to as a
regular random utility function may be restated in terms of our model as
follows: Dene
N+ (M; p) = f! 2 
 j p ! p0, 8p0 2M; p0 6= pg:
Then  is regular if,

 [p2MN+ (M; p) = 1; 8M 2M.
If  is regular, then the random choice rule implied by our model assigns pi,
i = 1; :::; n; the probability
M (pi) =
X
!2	M (pi)
(!). (7)
By denition,  is a random choice rule represented by the random utility
model depicted in section 2. It can be shown that the random choice rule 
satises the axioms of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006).13
Ahn and Sarver (2013) synthesized the random choice model of Gul and
Pesendorfer (2006) and the menu choice model of Dekel et. al. (2001) to
12Since Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Ahn and Sarver (2013) deal with menu choice
under risk, we present the random choice behavior in the same context. However, the
discussion should make it clear that the same logic applies to stochastic choice under
uncertainty.
13If M is such that 'M (!) is a singleton for all ! 2 
; then, for all p 2 M  M 0;
	M (p)  	M 0(p). Hence, M (p)  M 0 (p) : Hence,  is monotone. For all q 2 (X) and
 2 (0; 1] let M^ = M+(1  ) fqg := fpi+(1  ) q j pi 2Mg: Then, by independence,
for all p 2M; 	M (p) = 	M^ (p+ (1  ) q): Hence, M (p) = M^ (p+ (1  ) q) : Thus,
 is linear. Also, since in our model, decision makers are expected utility maximizers,
restricting choice to extreme points entails no essential loss. So  is extreme. Finally, for
all M;M 0 2 M, and  2 [0; 1] let M + (1  )M 0 = fp+ (1  ) p0 j p 2 M;p0 2 M 0g:
Then, M+(1 )M 0(p+ (1  ) p0) = f! 2 
 j p+ (1  ) p0 2 'M+(1 )M 0 (!)g: But
p+(1  ) p0 2 'M+(1 )M 0 (!) implies p 2 'M (!) and p0 2 'M 0 (!) : Hence, variations
in  will not change M+(1 )M 0(p+ (1  ) p0): Thus,  is mixture continuous.
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obtain a representation of a two-stage decision process in which, in the rst
stage, decision makers choose among menus and their preferences have a rep-
resentation a la Dekel et. al., and in the second stage, they make a stochastic
choice from the menu selected in the rst stage according to a distribution
function (and a tie breaking rule) that has a Gul-Pesendorfer representa-
tion. Ahn and Sarver identify the necessary and sucient conditions for
the representation of Dekel et. al. (2001) and that of Gul and Pesendorfer
(2006) to be consistent, in the sense that the decision maker's prior on the
subjective state space and state-dependent utility functions agree with the
distribution depicting his stochastic choice behavior and the corresponding
state-dependent utility functions of Gul and Pesendorfer.
As explained in the Introduction, the model presented in this paper as-
sume that this synthesis exists. If M is a menu that was selected in the
rst stage then, as we assumed in section (3.1), when facing a choice among
lotteries, the decision maker anticipates that a state of mind from 
 is drawn
according to the distribution ; and that this state of mind determines his
choice. If this anticipation is correct then the probability that pi is chosen is
given equation (7).
Despite the similarity, the random choice behavior in this paper is fun-
damentally dierent from that of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Ahn and
Sarver (2013). First, and foremost, in these models the function that as-
sociates each menu with a probability distribution over its elements, the
random choice rule, is a primitive concept. By contrast, in the model of sec-
tion 2, it is a derived concept. Second, the essence of the model of Ahn and
Sarver (2013) is consistency between the (ex-ante) anticipated choice and
(ex-post) actual stochastic choice, which is exogenously given. The essence
of the present model is consistency between the introspective beliefs and the
actual beliefs, represented by the probabilities on the mental state space.
Lu (2014) and Dillenberger, Lleras, Sadowski and Takeoka (2014) address
the issue of identifying the distribution of private information signals from
choice behavior. Both invoke preference relation on the nonempty subsets
of Anscombe-Aumann (1963) acts but take dierent approaches. Lu (2014)
extends the random choice model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) to include
decision problems that consist of Anscombe-Aumann acts. In the individual
interpretation of Lu's model, a decision maker receives a signal that aects
his choice behavior. The signal is a draw from a distribution on a canonical
signal space of beliefs (that is, prior distribution of the material state space)
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and tastes (that is, a set of utility functions) and is private information.
Lu provides an axiomatic characterization of the random choice rule that is
necessary and sucient for it to have a information representation.14
Dillenberger et. al. (2014) propose a theory of subjective learning accord-
ing to which the preference relations on menus of Anscombe-Aumann (1963)
acts reect decision makers' anticipated acquisition of private information
before a choice of an act from the menu must be made. They analyze the
axiomatic structure that allows an uninformed observer to infer from decision
makers' choice behavior, the distribution of the signals (that is, underlying
information structure) that govern their ex post choices.15
Despite sharing some features with the theory advanced here, the works
of Lu (2014) and Dillenberger et. al. (2014) are dierent from the one of this
paper conceptually, methodologically, and structurally. To begin with, their
objective is a representation of an analyst's inference of the decision maker's
private information from his choice behavior. By contrast, in this paper it is
the decision maker who is unsure about his own preferences, and the main
trust of our analysis is the representation of the decision maker's beliefs about
the evolution of his own preferences and choice behavior. The analysis of Lu
and Dillenberger et. al. is based on preference relation among menus and
are anchored in the revealed preference methodology. By contrast, the model
of this paper requires that, in addition to preference relation on menus, the
decision maker express his preferences on a set of hypothetical lotteries. This
departure from the revealed preference methodology has its benets in terms
of its greater generality. Specically, this work is concerned with the decision
maker's uncertainty about his preferences which include beliefs as well as his
tastes. Moreover, the information structure, which is focus of the analysis
of Dillenberger et. al. (2014), corresponds to the beliefs in the model of
this paper. Their model and analysis neither intended nor can it address the
issue of uncertain tastes which is at the core of the present analysis. Finally,
analytical framework, the axiomatic structures and the representations of the
preferences in the works of Lu and Dillenberger et. al. models are dierent
from those presented here.
14Lu (2014) contains additional results and analysis that are not directly related to this
work.
15Dillenberger et al. (2014) also apply their model to the analysis of dynamic decision
making tracing the eect of anticipated arrival of information. These aspects of their
paper are not directly related to this work.
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4 Concluding Remarks
4.1 Menu choice and choice from menus
The use of menu choice in this paper is based on the tacit assumption that
choice behavior involves two points in time, the time of choice of a menu, say
t0; and, subsequently, at time t1; a choice of an element from the menu. The
rst is not a random choice, the second is. To grasp the dierence consider
consider two acts f and f 0 and the corresponding degenerate menusM = ffg
andM 0 = ff 0g: According to Theorem 1, at the choice at time t0 betweenM
andM 0 is non-random. Specically, since f = fM and f 0 = fM 0 ; by (1) f < f 0
if and only if
P
!2

 (!) [u (!; fM (!))  u (!; fM 0 (!))]  0: However, if at time
t0 the decision maker is presented with a choice between the acts f and f
0;
this is a choice from the menu ff; f 0g: According to our theory, his choice is
determined by his state of mind and, therefore, is random. In particular, if
his state of mind at time t0 is !; he will choose f if u(!; f) > u (!; f
0) and,
disregarding indierence, will choose f 0; otherwise.
4.2 A remark on methodology
The stochastic choice model advanced in this paper links actual choice among
menus to introspective beliefs concerning one's moods and/or possible per-
sona. The representation of introspective beliefs, is derived from verbally
expressed preferences among hypothetically state-acts lotteries. Method-
ologically speaking, this is not a revealed preference theory. We presume,
however, that decision makers are able to express such preferences. Consider,
for example, a professor who has just being asked to revise and resubmit a
paper for journal publication. Suppose that this request signals that the
chances of eventual acceptance increased from 20% to 80%. Let there be two
lotteries: Lottery A oers a 60% chance of winning a ticket to performance
of Beethoven's 9th symphony and 40% chance of winning a ticket to a per-
formance of Mozart's requiem, and lottery B oers a 40% chance of winning
a ticket to performance of Beethoven's 9th symphony and 60% chance of
winning a ticket to a performance of Mozart's requiem. Suppose that both
concerts are scheduled to take place shortly after the expected nal decision
on the publication. It is reasonable to suppose that prior to receiving the
revise and resubmit decision the professor expresses preferences for lottery
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A, and after receiving the news he would prefer lottery B. We presume that
such expressions are meaningful testimony to his attitudes and that these
attitudes are consistent with his actual choice behavior.
But these are preferences on state-act lotteries. Specically, there are
two (constant) acts, namely, attending the performance of Beethoven's 9th
symphony and attending the performance of Mozart's requiem. There are
two moods, elation associated with the article being accepted and sadness
associated with a rejection. Prior to receiving the news, the state-act lotteries
corresponding to lotteries A and B, respectively are:
ActnMood Elation Sadness
Beethoven's 9th 0:12 0:48
Mozart's requiem 0:08 0:32
and
ActnMood Elation Sadness
Beethoven's 9th 0:08 0:32
Mozart's requiem 0:12 0:48
The corresponding lotteries after receiving the news are
ActnMood Elation Sadness
Beethoven's 9th 0:48 0:12
Mozart's requiem 0:32 0:08
and
ActnMood Elation Sadness
Beethoven's 9th 0:32 0:08
Mozart's requiem 0:48 0:12
Hence, the aforementioned expression of preferences are preferences on these
state-acts lotteries.
Direct verbal interrogation is regarded with suspicion by decision theo-
rists. Savage (1972) put it very bluntly: \If the state of mind in question is
not capable of manifesting itself in some sort of extraverbal behavior, it is
extraneous to our main interest ..." (Savage [1972] p. 28). Yet, in another
passage, Savage proposes an approach which he refers to as mode of inter-
rogation between behavioral and direct. \One can, namely, ask the person,
not how he feels but what he would do in such and such situation. In so far
as the theory of decision under development is regarded as empirical one, the
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intermediate mode is a compromise between economy and rigor. But in the
theory's more normative interpretation as a set of criteria of consistency for
us to apply to our decisions, the intermediate mode is just the right one."
(Savage [1972] p. 28). The intermediate mode alluded to by Savage can be
applied to elicit the utility functions using the expressed preferences among
state-acts lotteries.
One advantage of our model is that it allows for a more structured analy-
sis of the response of the decision maker to signals that make him update his
beliefs about the mental states (e.g. according to Bayes rule). The editorial
decision discussed above or, a good (bad) medical report generating a sense
of optimism (pessimism) that aect the likelihoods of distinct states of mind,
are but a couple of concrete examples. Such signals, result in correspond-
ing changes in the decision maker's preferences over menus and her random
choice. In the literatures dealing with menu choice and random choice, such
changes are exogenous changes in tastes and/or beliefs. In our model, the
same changes are response to belief updating and therefore, are predictable.
Similarly, using our model it would be possible to predict the eects of \mood
altering drugs" (e.g., anti-depressants) that aect the likelihoods of moods
(e.g., rst-order stochastic shift towards more upbeat moods) on random
choice behavior.
The model presented here presumes that the set of mental states are
known to outside observers (e.g., econometricians). Consequently, if the
choices from menus correspond to the underlying metal states then it would
be possible, using revealed preference methods, to assess the empirical distri-
bution of the mental states from the relative frequencies of observed choices.16
We hypothesize that the decision maker beliefs about the likely realizations
of his mental states, quantied by the probability distribution ; is consis-
tent with the ex post empirical distribution. In this context, we note that
the existing probability elicitation procedures are based on the odds decision
makers' are willing to accept when betting on events in the (material) states
space. These methods are not applicable when the state space under con-
sideration is the mental state space because, unlike the material state space
which is ex post public information, the mental states are private information
so betting on events in this state space is meaningless.
Finally, it is worth noting that in a recent paper, Karni (2015a) proposes
16This would correspond to the random choice rule of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006).
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a new mechanism designed to elicit the range of the set of priors and, at the
same time, the decision maker's introspective beliefs about the likelihoods of
the truth of the priors in the set. If states of mind correspond to distinct
beliefs rather than tastes, this mechanism lends revealed preference interpre-
tation of decision makers' introspective beliefs about the likelihoods of the
truth of their prior beliefs.
5 Proofs
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let fM ; fM 0 2 F and  2 [0; 1]. By denition fM (!) <! h;8h 2 M and
fM 0 (!) <! h;8h 2M 0: We need to show that there exist M^ 2M such that
fM^ = fM + (1  ) fM 0 : Consider the menu
M^ = ffM (!) + (1  ) fM 0 (!) j ! 2 
g:
Then, by two applications of (A.3), for all !0 2 

fM (!) + (1  ) fM 0 (!) <! fM (!0) + (1  ) fM 0 (!0) :
Hence fM + (1  ) fM 0 = fM^ and is, by denition, an element of F: Thus,
F is a convex set. 
5.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let `; `0 2 L (
; H) and  2 [0; 1]. To show that ` + (1  ) `0 2 L (
; H) ;
we need to show that J (`+ (1  ) `0) 2 F: By denition, for all ! 2 

J (`+ (1  ) `0) (!) =X
h2H

` (!; h)
` (!)

` (!)
` (!) + (1  )`0 (!)h+
X
h2H

`0 (!; h)
`0 (!)

(1  )`0 (!)
` (!) + (1  )`0 (!)h:
Let `(!)
`(!)+(1 )`0 (!) = ; then J (`+ (1  ) `
0) (!) = J (`) (!)+(1  ) J (`0) (!) ;
for all ! 2 
: Hence, by the convexity of F; J (`+ (1  ) `0) = J (`) +
(1  ) J (`0) 2 F: 
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
(a) (Suciency) By Lemma 2, L (
; H) is a convex set. Since  satis-
es (A.1) - (A.4), by the expected utility theorem, there exist continuous,
non-constant, real-valued function u on 
  H which is ane in its second
argument and unique up to positive linear transformation, such that, for all
`; `0 2 L (
; H)
` < `0 , P
!2

P
h2H
u (!; h) ` (!; h)  P
!2

P
h2H
u (!; h) `0 (!; h) : (8)
Hence, (2) holds. Note that when ` is non-degenerate, (8) can be rewritten
as
` < `0 , P
!2

` (!)u (!; J (`) (!)) 
P
!2

`0 (!)u (!; J (`
0) (!))
Since F is a convex set and < satises (A.1) - (A.4), there exist con-
tinuous, non-constant, real-valued function v on 
 H; ane in its second
argument and unique up to cardinal unit-comparable transformation, such
that for all fM ; fM 0 2 F;
fM < fM 0 ,
P
!2

v (!; fM (!)) 
P
!2

v (!; fM 0(!)) : (9)
Fix h, an interior point of H, let B
h  H be a closed ball centered
at h, denote by h (!) the unique maximizer of <! over Bh and let M =
h (!) j ! 2 
	 be a menu consisting of these maximal points. Since ! 6= !0
implies ! 6=!0 , h (!) 6= h (!0) and each h (!) has a neighborhood N h! such
that, for all h 2 N h! and !0 6= !, h ! h (!0) and h (!0) !0 h. Hence, for all
h 2 N h! and M! = fhg [

h (!0) j !0 6= !; !0 2 
	,
f M! (!
0) =

h !0 = !
h (!0) !0 6= !
Dene ` M = K (f M) and consider an obviously nonnull ! 2 
: Let L! de-
note the subset of lotteries in L (
; H) that agree with ` M outside ! and de-
note F! = J (L!). By (A.5), < restricted to lotteries in L! and < restricted
to F! agree (that is, for all `; `
0 2 L!, and J (`) ; J (`0) 2 F! then ` < `0 if
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and only if J (`) < J (`0)).17 For the restricted relations < and < the func-
tions u (!; ) and v (!; ) constitute, respectively, von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions on the subset of acts H! = fh 2 H j h = fM (!) ; fM 2 F!g.
By the preceding argument, H! contains the open neighborhood N
h
! : Hence,
by the anity and uniqueness of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility func-
tions u (!; ) and v (!; ), v (!; ) = b (!)u (!; ) + a (!) ; where b (!) > 0: As
each v (!; ) can be rescaled by subtracting a (!), we assume (without loss of
generality) that v (!; ) = b (!)u (!; ). For ! obviously null let b (!) = 0.
Thus, v (!; h) = b (!)u (!; h) ; for all ! 2 
 and h 2 H:
By (A.4), there exist an obviously nonnull state of mind, thus, b (!) > 0
for some ! 2 
: Dene  (!) = b (!) =!02
b (!0) and observe that, by (9),
fM < fM 0 ,
P
!2

 (!) [u (!; fM(!))  u (!; fM 0(!))]  0: (10)
Hence, (1) holds.
(Necessity) The proof is immediate and is omitted.
(b) This is an immediate implication of the uniqueness of u in (8).
(c) Assume that all ! are obviously nonnull and consider the menu M
dened in part (a). Since ! is obviously nonnull then there are f; f 0 2
F; such that f agrees with f 0 outside !; and f  f 0: Hence, (1) implies that
 (!) [u (!; f (!))  u (!; f 0 (!))] > 0: Thus,  (!) > 0 for all !.
Suppose that there exists 0 6=  that, in conjunction with u; satisfy the
representations in (1) and (2). We may write (1) as
J (`) < J (`0)
() P
!2

 (!) [u (!; J (`) (!))  u (!; J (`0) (!))]  0
() P
!2

0 (!) [u (!; J (`) (!))  u (!; J (`0) (!))]  0:
Since  6= 0; there are !,!0 2 
; such that  (!) > 0 (!) and  (!0) <
0 (!0). For p 2 [0; 1] dene
`p
 
!; h (!)

=  (!) p; `0p
 
!0; h (!0)

=  (!0) (1  p)
`p
 
!; h (!0)

=  (!) (1  p) ; `0p
 
!0; h (!)

=  (!0) p
17see Karni and Schmeidler (2015).
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`p
 
!0; h (!)

=  (!0) and `0p
 
!; h (!0)

=  (!)
and, for all !00 2 
nf!; !0g; `p
 
!00; h (!00)

= `0p
 
!00; h (!00)

: Then
J (`p) (!) = ph (!) + (1  p) h (!0) , J (`p) (!0) = h (!) ;
and
J
 
`0p

(!0) = (1  p) h (!0) + ph (!) , J  `0p (!) = h (!0)
and J (`p) (!
00) = J
 
`0p

(!00) ; for all !00 2 
nf!; !0g:
By denition, h (!) ! h (!0) and h (!0) !0 h (!) : Hence, J (`p) < J
 
`0p

if and only if
p (!)

u
 
!; h (!)
  u  !; h (!0)+(1  p)  (!0) u  !0; h (!)  u  !0; h (!0)  0
if and only if
p0 (!)

u
 
!; h (!)
  u  !; h (!0)+(1  p) 0 (!0) u  !0; h (!)  u  !0; h (!0)  0:
But u
 
!; h (!)
   u  !; h (!0) > 0 and u  !0; h (!)   u  !0; h (!0) < 0:
Moreover,  (!) > 0 and 0 (!0) > 0: Thus, there exists p such that
p (!)

u
 
!; h (!)
  u  !; h (!0)+(1  p)  (!0) u  !0; h (!)  u  !0; h (!0) = 0
but then, since  (!) > 0 (!) and  (!0) < 0 (!0)
p0 (!)

u
 
!; h (!)
  u  !; h (!0)+(1  p) 0 (!0) u  !0; h (!)  u  !0; h (!0) < 0:
This is the required contradiction. 
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